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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how emerging and developed market multination-
als (EMMs and DMMs) differ in their acquisition behavior (vis-à-vis the choice of partial versus full 
acquisitions) when entering a developed market economy, Japan. We hypothesize that EMMs prefer 
partial acquisitions, whereas DMMs prefer full acquisitions due to what we call the country-of-origin 
effect. Additionally, we hypothesize that this country-of-origin effect is more pronounced for smaller 
firms. The results, based upon 224 strategic cross-border acquisitions in Japan, support these two hy-
potheses. This study contributes to the literature on EMMs.
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1  Introduction
Emerging market multinationals (EMMs) have received increasing attention in inter-
national business literature in the last two decades (Agnihotri & Bhattacharya, 2018; 
Buckley et al., 2014; Demirbag et al., 2009; Marchand, 2017; Luo, 1998; Panibratov et 
al., 2018; Sarapovas et al., 2016). Studies have shown that EMMs differ from developed 
market multinationals (DMMs) in a number of areas such as strategic flexibility (Luo & 
Rui, 2009), motivation for expansion (Luo & Tung, 2007), pace of internationalization 
(Dunning, 2006; Mathews, 2006), and firm specific advantages (Guillen & Garcia-Ca-
nal, 2009). However, only a limited number of studies have compared characteristics of 
country-of-origin effects between EMMs and DMMs with regard to their acquisition 
behavior. Similarly, very few studies have been conducted to contrast EMMs to DMMs 
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vis-à-vis their choice of partial versus full acquisitions (Chikhouni et al., 2017; Contrac-
tor et al., 2014; Lahiri et al., 2014). In this study, a full acquisition refers to a complete 
transfer of the target’s ownership to the acquirer, whereas a partial acquisition signifies 
a fractional ownership transfer. 
Several studies have been conducted to investigate the country-of-origin effect, 
with targets acquired in emerging markets (Contractor et al., 2014; Lahiri et al., 2014). 
Chikhouni et al. (2017) went a step further and contrasted cross-border transactions of 
EMMs and DMMs in emerging and developed markets. However, their focus was on 
moderating variables, rather than on direct effects of country-of-origin. To the best of 
the authors’ knowledge, how DMMs and EMMs differ in their choice of partial versus 
full acquisitions in a developed market remains a gap in the literature. 
In this study, we focus on Japanese targets of cross-border acquisitions. We argue 
that acquisitions in Japan provide important insights for a number of reasons. First, 
various attempts were undertaken by the Japanese government during the 1997-2001 
period to liberalize M&A activities (Takechi, 2011). Subsequently, the number of 
foreign firms making acquisitions in Japan has increased significantly. Second, Japan 
enjoys an exclusive geographical advantage as many emerging economies are located 
nearby, or at least at a convenient distance to Japan. Examples of such countries are 
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Third, Japan ranks among the top economies 
in the world, and emerging economies find it particularly attractive to invest in Japan 
(Recof, 2018). Hence, in this study, we test two hypotheses on a dataset of 224 strategic 
cross-border acquisitions in Japan. First, we hypothesize that DMMs, unlike EMMs, 
prefer full acquisitions when entering Japan. Additionally, we hypothesize that the size 
of the acquirer is crucial in affecting the relationship between the country-of-origin of 
the acquirer (DMMs versus EMMs) and the acquisition mode (partial versus full ac-
quisitions). More specifically, we hypothesize that tendency of DMMs to prefer full ac-
quisitions and that of EMMs to prefer partial acquisitions will be more pronounced for 
smaller firms. The results, subject to a number of robustness checks, support these two 
hypotheses. Hence, we contribute to the growing literature on EMMs, entry mode, and 
cross-border acquisitions by showing fine-grained differences of acquisition behavior 
of bidders that are DMMs and EMMs.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the relevant literature 
followed by several hypotheses. After that, we present our research design and meas-
urement of variables. Next, the data and descriptive statistics are presented, followed by 
results and robustness checks. The study ends with a discussion and conclusion.
2 Literature Review
2.1. Market entrance modes
Early models of entry mode, in a nutshell, assume entry mode choice solely determined 
by multinational enterprises (MNE). More specifically, those models are based upon 
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various features of MNE such as control, risk appetite, or experience in the host mar-
ket (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Dunning’s (1988) OLI 
and the internationalization model by Rugman and Verbeke (1990) do recognize that 
MNEs seek to bundle (or combine) their firm-specific advantages (FSA) with comple-
mentary assets present in the host country. For example, MNEs with firm specific ad-
vantages in technology attempt to bundle their technology with complementary assets 
such as distribution networks of targets in the host country. 
Hennart (2009) challenges prior literature to claim that complementary assets are 
not freely available to all participants. Departing from this idea, the bundling model 
takes into account that transaction cost dynamics of complementary assets play a major 
role in investment behavior and that equal access to complementary assets may not be 
given (Dow, 2017). Nevertheless, the bundling model still predicts that the entry mode 
choice of EMMs and DMMs would be the same when entering a foreign country. 
2.2.  Differences between EMMs and DMMs in international expansion
Early theories of entry mode focused solely on the expansion of DMMs from Europe, 
especially Britain, or from the US. It was found that these firms expanded globally after 
they had internally developed intangible assets such as technology, brand names, or su-
perior managerial expertise (Dunning, 1988). DMMs expand both vertically and hori-
zontally. Vertical expansion occurs when a firm sets up its production or distribution in a 
forward or backward supply chain in a foreign country. In contrast, horizontal expansion 
takes place when firms locate a similar line of business in other countries. Vertical expan-
sion is usually motivated by cost-related reasons, while horizontal expansion is often a 
result of possessing intangible assets such as brand names or technologies. Hence, when 
EMMs start to expand vertically, scholars can still justify these movements easily with 
their existing theories. However, when EMMs start to expand their cross-border invest-
ment operations horizontally, e.g. to take over a firm in the same line of business, scholars 
lack theoretical justification for these movements (Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 2009).
Researchers respond to these horizontal expansions of EMMs in three major ways 
(Chikhouni et al., 2014; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Gammeltoft et al., 2010). One group 
argues that conventional theories still hold unchanged to explain market entrance mode 
of EMMs (Rugman, 2009). Another group claims that this phenomenon requires new 
theories (Mathews, 2006; Hennart, 2009, 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007). The third group 
argues that existing theories (applicable so far to DMMs) have to be extended to in-
clude EMM characteristics instead of developing new theories (Chikhouni et al., 2014; 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012). To theorize characteristics of EMMs in building new concepts, 
the literature has witnessed a tremendous increase of EMM studies on international 
expansion compared to traditional DMM studies (Buckley & Munjal, 2017; Kalasin et 
al., 2014; Malhotra et al., 2011; Ning et al., 2014; Jormanainen & Koveshnikov, 2012).
Luo and Tung (2007) present a springboard perspective to explain motivation, dy-
namics, processes, and challenges unique to international expansion of EMMs. They 
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contend that EMMs’ international expansion was motivated by their need to acquire 
strategic assets and to reduce institutional and market constraints at home. Building 
upon this springboard argument, Elango and Pattnaik (2011) show that EMMs’ re-
source commitment in cross-border acquisitions (in terms of transaction value over 
acquirer assets) is positively affected by the firm’s absorptive capacity and acquisition 
experience. Mathews (2006) argue that EMMs are different from DMMs based on 
three distinct characteristics, viz. rapid internationalization, strategic innovation, and 
organizational innovation. Focusing on the process of knowledge flows, Awate et al. 
(2015) suggest that DMMs’ internationalization can be explained in terms of a twin 
strategy to exploit and to create competence. In contrast, EMMs’ internationalization 
is motivated by a catch-up strategy, when EMMs’ headquarters access knowledge from 
R&D facilities in advanced economies. Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008) argue that 
EMMs have an advantage over DMMs when investing in least-developed countries. 
Findings support their argument that there is a higher presence of EMMs in less de-
veloped countries than that of DMMs. According to Ramamurti (2012a), EMMs pose 
a competitive threat to DMMs in that manner. He further argues that non-traditional 
advantages of EMMs such as deep understanding of customers in emerging markets, or 
the ability to make products at ultra-low costs are in no way inferior to technological or 
brand-related advantages of DMMs (Ramamurti, 2012b). 
Luo and Rui (2009) conceptualize an ambidexterity perspective towards EMMs, 
i.e. EMMs have greater need, motivation, and ability to exercise ambidexterity than 
DMMs. Nevertheless, taking an evolutionary perspective, Narula (2012) contends that 
EMMs still have limited capabilities, resulting in inadequate development of location 
assets in their home countries. According to Narula (2012), the differences between 
EMMs and DMMs would diminish in the near future. Michailova and Ang (2008) ex-
amine how regulatory, normative, and cognitive pillars of institutions affect firms when 
conducting non-equity alliances versus equity alliances. Based on insights of the insti-
tutional theory, they find that this relationship is moderated by the status of host coun-
tries (whether they are developed or emerging). 
It must be mentioned that Chinese firms especially have received much attention 
in this regard (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Masiero et al., 2017; Xia et al., 2014; Xie, 
2017; Xie & Li; 2017; Yiu et al., 2017). For example, Child and Rodrigues (2005) 
argue that Chinese MNEs differ from DMMs by having a late-comer perspective, 
catch-up strategies, an institutionalized role of government, a different relationship of 
entrepreneurs to Chinese institutions, and that they face a stronger liability of foreign-
ness than their DMM counterparts when investing abroad. Based on their research on 
the tenets of the resource dependence theory, Xia et al. (2014) show that the level of 
interdependence between Chinese and foreign firms is positively associated with the 
level of outward foreign direct investment activities, i.e. the higher the investment, the 
higher the dependence. Additionally, there is evidence that this relationship is weak-
er for local firms with a higher level of state ownership. Yiu et al. (2007) focus their 
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research on the international venturing of Chinese firms. They show that positive ef-
fects of firm-specific ownership advantages on international venturing are moderated 
by the degree of home industry competition and export intensity. A further finding 
is that this relationship is mediated by the intensity of corporate entrepreneurship 
transformation. In a different study, Xie and Li (2017) investigate the extent to which 
Chinese cross-border acquisitions are influenced by either the investment behavior of 
DMMs or by their Chinese peers. Their results show that Chinese firms tend to imitate 
their peers rather than foreign DMMs. They additionally find that state-owned firms 
show a lower likelihood to imitate other firms. In their conceptual paper, Masiero et 
al. (2017) focus on the Chinese phenomenon of going global in groups and evidence 
that such Chinese firms’ internationalizing in groups enjoyed more advantages than 
individual firms. Luo (1998) contrasts Chinese target firms taken over by EMMs or 
DMMs. He finds that the targets taken over by DMMs scored higher on strategic traits 
like product diversity, market breadth, pro-activeness, futurity, R&D intensity, and 
resource commitment. In contrast, Chinese targets acquired by EMMs implement a 
stronger promotion program. Hence, the review of literature shows that the character-
istics of EMMs and DMMs differ on entry modes.
2.3. Choice of partial versus full acquisitions 
There are only a limited number of studies distinguishing EMMs and DMMs on entry 
mode with regard to their choice of partial versus full acquisitions (Chikhouni et al., 
2017; Contractor et al., 2014; Lahiri et al., 2014). Focusing on acquisitions of targets in 
China and India, Contractor et al. (2014) added country-of-origin as a control variable 
in their study based on the belief that “a firm from one emerging market [EMM] plan-
ning to acquire an entity in another emerging market may be at a relative advantage [as 
compared to other DMM] owing to its general familiarity with the cultural, risk-related, 
and industrial environments of the target nation” (p. 936). Despite strong theoretical 
argumentation, the country-of-origin variable was found to have insignificant influence.
Lahiri et al. (2014) examine cross-border acquisitions in the services industry in 
India, investigating how the choice of partial versus full acquisition is affected by three 
variables, viz. the type of service (hard versus soft), institutional distance, and coun-
try-of-origin. They find evidence that when EMMs acquired targets in India, two var-
iables, viz. the choice of soft services and a higher institutional distance increase the 
likelihood of full acquisitions. However, for DMM acquirers, both variables have an 
opposite effect. Their results show that, ceteris paribus, EMMs preferred full acquisi-
tions when taking over Indian firms, whereas DMMs prefer partial acquisitions. These 
results are in line with the argument of Contractor et al. (2014) that in an emerging 
market, EMMs prefer full acquisitions, whereas partial acquisitions are more likely with 
DMMs. 
Chikhouni et al. (2017) investigate how the choice of partial versus full acquisition 
is influenced by the direction of investments and their psychic distance. They focus 
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on four directions (or scenarios) as follows: DMMs acquiring in emerging markets, 
DMMs acquiring in developed markets, EMMs acquiring in emerging markets, and 
EMMs acquiring in developed markets. They find that a higher psychic distance is as-
sociated with the choice of partial acquisitions for the first three scenarios. In contrast, 
for the last scenario, EMMs with a higher psychic distance to their (developed country) 
targets made full acquisitions. In this study, we compare the phenomenon of EMMs 
and DMMs acquiring targets in a developed market economy. More precisely, focusing 
on Japan as a developed (target) market, we add to the literature on how EMMs and 
DMMs differ in their choice of partial versus full acquisition.
3.  Hypothesis development
We build our hypothesis upon the dominant view of the literature regarding the 
reasons for EMMs and DMMs undertaking international expansion. For DMMs 
we assume that firms expand to other countries (in our case, Japan) primarily for ex-
ploitation of their resources or to access the local market (Gullien & Garcia-Canal, 
2009). For EMMs we assume that firms expand to Japan through asset-seeking mo-
tives to acquire brand names, knowledge, technology (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; 
Deng, 2007; Madhok & Keyhani, 2012; Rui & Yip, 2008) or to seek a new market 
(Ning & Sutherland, 2012). While acknowledging that exceptions exist (Pradhan, 
2010), we contend that these assumptions allow us to compare two groups, specif-
ically EMMs and DMMs, investing in a developed market country, namely Japan. 
When DMMs acquire Japanese firms for specialized technology, it is arguably 
beneficial to conduct full acquisitions so that conflicts with the Japanese partner 
side can be eliminated. This line of reasoning that applies to technology can be ex-
tended to distribution. To sell products, DMMs require market-specific knowledge 
about Japan such as distribution network, marketing, sales, and logistics. Hence, 
DMMs taking over Japanese targets can secure the whole process without any in-
terference by the Japanese side only through a full acquisition. More specifically, as 
Japan recently experienced an increased liberalization of their M&A industry, full 
acquisitions of firms with established distribution networks are easier to handle and 
face less political resistance, unlike in the past. A case in point, for instance, is the 
full acquisition of a Japanese target, Dimatech Corporation, by US-based NetSili-
con. Japan was considered as a potential market for their specialized technology of 
embedded Ethernet networking solutions. 
Scholars contend that the strategy of EMMs differs from DMMs when taking 
over cross-border targets. EMMs acquire targets which are easier to manage as they 
have less experience with foreign market entrances (Xi & Li, 2017). Based on the 
latecomer perspective, EMMs are more inclined to participate in targets rather than 
make full acquisitions. As Japanese target firms often own brand names and special-
ized technology, transaction costs for EMMs are generally quite considerable owing 
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to their high asset specificities. Moreover, political pressure can result in partial ac-
quisitions when, for instance, the target country government does not permit for-
eign firms to make full acquisitions (Child & Rodriguez, 2005). This pressure nat-
urally is higher for EMMs entering a developed market economy than for DMMs. 
An example is the Japanese target firm, Renown, for which a Chinese firm (Shan-
dong Ruyi) initiated a partial acquisition (APLF, 2010). Another example provid-
ing support for our argumentation that EMMs tend to make partial acquisitions of 
cross-border targets is the case of PT Astra Otoparts Tbk, an Indonesian firm that 
acquired a minority stake in E-tech Incorporated in 2007. This allowed the Indo-
nesian auto parts manufacturer to benefit from the target’s expertise in electronic 
equipment. Furthermore, it permitted the target to get more solid knowledge about 
Indonesian customers. Hence, we expect a higher likelihood that DMMs invest in 
Japan by making full acquisitions, while EMMs would rather partly participate in 
Japanese firms. Our first hypothesis is as follows:
H 1: When entering Japan, country-of-origin matters such that DMMs prefer full acquisitions, 
whereas EMMs prefer partial acquisitions.
We now theorize on how size of the acquiring firm has a moderating influence on 
the relationship between the acquirer’s country-of-origin (EMM or DMM) and the 
acquisition mode (partial or full acquisitions). Large firms have superior and more ad-
vanced technology, distribution capabilities and better marketing in their home coun-
tries. This is especially true for DMMs, and also to some extent for EMMs. Besides our 
argumentation leading to Hypothesis 1 that DMMs have a higher likelihood of making 
full acquisitions because of their need for growth and control (Chikhouni et al., 2017; 
Cui & Jiang, 2012; Lee et al., 2008), we are also of the view that EMMs and DMMs dif-
fer in their choice of partial versus full acquisitions when the size of the acquiring firm 
is taken into consideration. 
For bigger firms, it may not matter too much if they are EMMs or DMMs. Bigger 
EMMs often enjoy good support from their governments (Child & Rodriguez, 2005). 
Also, they have good networks and can afford to employ consultants in host countries 
(Wright et al., 2005). Hence, larger EMMs are less dependent on external pressure than 
the smaller ones. In other words, because of the similarities between large EMMs and 
DMMs, the decision by both firms to make a full acquisition when entering a country 
like Japan reflects comparable behavior. To illustrate such a case, we look at a small In-
donesian firm, PT Astra Otoparts Tbk, and a Chinese firm, The Founder Group. The 
former partially bought into E-tech Incorporated to enter Japan, while the latter, The 
Founder Group, (9 times bigger than the Indonesian firm) opted for full acquisition by 
buying a Japanese software firm, True Luck Group Ltd.
We argue that EMMs, on average, prefer partial acquisitions because smaller EMMs 
have more shortcomings than bigger EMMs. They do not have the government backup 
that bigger EMMs have (Hennart, 2012). Also, technologically advanced targets are 
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expensive to acquire. Full acquisitions are affordable even by smaller DMMs with high 
savings or good access to loans. However, smaller EMMs, in most cases, do not have 
these advantages. Also because of their late mover characteristics, bigger EMMs are 
eager to fully acquire targets so as to close the gap to the more established DMMs. This 
idea, however, does not apply to smaller EMMs. Because of their newness and their 
inexperience, transaction costs for smaller EMMs are relatively high even when com-
pared to smaller DMMs (Xie, 2017). In sum, we expect that especially smaller EMMs 
and DMMs differ in their investment behavior. Our arguments on contrasting the size 
of DMMs and EMMs lead to the following hypothesis.
H 2: The country-of-origin effect on the choice of partial versus full acquisitions for Japanese tar-
gets is moderated by the size of the acquiring firm, such that the tendency of EMMs to prefer par-
tial acquisitions and that of DMMs to prefer full acquisitions is stronger for smaller firms.
The conceptual model is presented in Figure 1.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country-of-origin effect 
(DMMs, EMMs) 
Acquision behavior 
(paral, full) 
Acquirer size 
FIGURE 1.  Conceptual Model
4.  Research design and measurement of variables
4.1. Econometric Model
The categorical dependent variable in our study represents partial and full acquisitions. 
Therefore, we employed a logistic regression analysis (Arslan & Wang, 2015; Liang et 
al., 2009). More specifically, we used the following model:
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 (𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1)
= 𝛽𝛽𝑂𝑂 + 𝛽𝛽1(𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐)
+ 𝛽𝛽2(𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝛽𝛽3(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐) + 𝛽𝛽4(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐)
+ 𝛽𝛽5(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐) + 𝛽𝛽6(𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝛽𝛽7(𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 −  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)
+ 𝛽𝛽8(𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 −  𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀) + 𝛽𝛽9(𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 −  𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)
+ 𝛽𝛽10(𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 −  𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈) + 𝛽𝛽11(𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎ℎ 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐)
+ 𝛽𝛽12(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐) + 𝛽𝛽13(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)
+ 𝛽𝛽14(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) +  𝜀𝜀  
 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 (𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1)
= 𝛽𝛽𝑂𝑂 + 𝛽𝛽1(𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐)
+ 𝛽𝛽2(𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝛽𝛽3(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐) + 𝛽𝛽4(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐)
+ 𝛽𝛽5(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐) + 𝛽𝛽6(𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) + 𝛽𝛽7(𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 −  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)
+ 𝛽𝛽8(𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 −  𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀) + 𝛽𝛽9(𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 −  𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)
+ 𝛽𝛽10(𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 −  𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈) + 𝛽𝛽11(𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎ℎ 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐)
+ 𝛽𝛽12(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐) + 𝛽𝛽13(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎)
+ 𝛽𝛽14(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎) +  𝜀𝜀  
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In Model 1, we included only the control variables. In Model 2 and Model 3, we 
entered our focus variable (country-of-origin) and its interaction term (country-of-origin 
* acquirer size) respectively.
4.2. Dependent variable
The dependent variable, acquisition mode, took the value of one for full acquisitions, 
and zero for partial acquisitions. According to previous literature, a full acquisition in 
our study means that acquirers have 100% ownership in the target after the deal. Like-
wise, ownership of any percentage with less than 100% represents a partial acquisition 
(Lahiri et al., 2014; Liang et al., 2009; Mariotti et al., 2014). An alternative operational-
ization of this variable was used in robustness checks. 
4.3.  Independent and moderating variables
Our independent variable of primary concern, country-of-origin, was operationalized as 
a dummy variable, which took the value of one for EMMs and zero for DMMs. Follow-
ing similar studies (Chikhouni et al., 2017; Contractor et al., 2014; Lahiri et al., 2014), 
we identified emerging market economy firms as classified by Hoskisson et al. (2000). 
The moderating variable of the acquirer size was operationalized as the natural loga-
rithm of total assets (Chiu et al., 2018; Huang et al., 2014; Park et al., 2011; Pattnaik & 
Lee, 2014; Reuer & Ragozzino, 2012; Tang & Cheung, 2016).
4.4 . Control variables
We took into account various control variables at three levels, namely firm, industry, 
and country level. At the firm level, we measured acquirer experience by the number 
of acquisitions in the target country prior to the deal (Arslan & Wang, 2015; Duarte & 
Garcia-Canal, 2002, 2004). Following Ahammad et al. (2017), we operationalized the 
target size as the natural logarithm of market value, such that market value was estimat-
ed with the following formula: transaction value/share of equity sought × 100.
At the industry level, we included deal relatedness as a dummy variable receiving a 
value of one if acquirers and targets were from the same industry sub-group, and zero 
otherwise (Dang & Henry, 2016, Santalo & Becerra, 2008). We also added industry 
dummy variables to control for industry fixed effects (Lahiri et al., 2014).
At the country level, we controlled for cultural distances, differences in GDP growth 
rate, and included institutional distances. The cultural distances were measured based 
on four dimensions of Hofstede’s (1980) national cultural difference index (Arslan & 
Wang, 2015; Demirbag et al., 2007; Lahiri et al., 2014; Liang et al., 2009; Vasudeva et 
al., 2018). Following Ahammad et al. (2017), we included a separate variable for each 
dimension of culture. Hence, Cultural distance - PDI, Cultural distance - IDV, Cultural 
distance - MAS, and Cultural distance – UAI correspond to power distance, individual-
ism, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity dimensions of culture, respectively. 
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TABLE 1. Summary of variables
Variables Definitions Similar applications in prior research
Data 
Sources
Acquisi-
tion mode
Dummy variable which took the value of 
one if acquirer’s ownership of the target 
firm equaled 100% (full acquisitions), and 
took the value of zero for any percentage 
less than 100% (partial acquisitions).
Lahiri et al. (2014); 
Liang et al. (2009); 
Mariotti et al. (2014)
Bloom-
berg data
Institu-
tional 
distance
Difference in country risk based on the 
World Bank’s six governance indicators 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009) 
following the formula of Morosini et al. 
(1998).
Lahiri et al. (2014); 
Contractor et al. (2014)
World 
Bank 
Data
GDP 
growth 
difference
Difference in GDP growth rate between 
home country and Japan based on three-
year average data ending one year before 
the deal.
Liang et al. (2009) World 
Bank 
Data
Cultural 
distance
Difference between home country and 
Japan on four dimensions of the Hofstede 
(1980) index. Separate variables for PDI, 
IDV, MAS, UAI corresponded to power 
distance, individualism, uncertainty 
avoidance and masculinity dimensions of 
culture respectively).
Ahammad et al. (2017); 
Chari & Chang (2009)
Hofstede 
et al. 
(2010)
Deal relat-
edness
A dummy variable which took the value of 
one if acquirer and target were from same 
industry sub-group, and took the value of 
zero otherwise.
Dang & Henry (2016); 
Santalo & Becerra 
(2008)
Bloom-
berg data
Target size Natural logarithm of the total assets. Ahammad et al. (2017) Bloom-
berg data
Acquirer 
experience
Number of acquisitions preceding the 
current deal.
Arslan & Wang (2015); 
Duarte & Garcia-Canal, 
2002, 2004
Bloom-
berg data
Acquirer 
size
Natural logarithm of the total assets. Chiu et al. (2018); 
Huang et al. (2014); 
Park et al. (2011); 
Pattnaik & Lee (2014); 
Reuer & Ragozzino 
(2012); Tang & Cheung 
(2016)
Bloom-
berg data
Country-
of-origin
A dummy variable which took the value of 
one for EMMs, and zero for DMMs
Chikhouni et al., 2017; 
Contractor et al., 2014; 
Lahiri et al., 2014
Hoskis-
son et al. 
(2000).
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The GDP growth rate difference variable was measured as the difference in the rate 
of GDP growth between acquirer home economy and Japan based on a three-year av-
erage, with data ending a year before the acquisition (Lahiri et al., 2014). Following 
Lahiri et al. (2014) and Contractor et al. (2014), we operationalized the institutional 
distance variable as the difference in country risk based on the World Bank’s six gov-
ernance indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2009) following the formula of Morosini et al. 
(1998). This measure was also based on a three-year average value, with data ending a 
year before the acquisition.
Since the sample was drawn from multiple years, we also included year dummies 
in the regression analysis. Variables, their definitions, previous applications and data 
sources are shown in Table 1.
5  Data and descriptive statistics
We retrieved the M&A transactions from the Bloomberg database with the following 
criteria: 1. Deal represented a cross-border acquisition of a target in Japan. 2. Deal was 
announced in the period 2001-2018. 3. Status of deal was completed. 4. Both target and 
acquirer were not from the finance industry. 5. Acquirer did not have any ownership in 
the target prior to the transaction, and acquirer owned at least 5% after the transaction.
From this initial dataset, we ignored deals with multiple acquirers*. Data availabil-
ity resulted in a sample of 224 deals from 22 countries. We used the classification of 
Hoskisson et al. (2000) and identified 7 of these countries as emerging market coun-
tries (Chikhouni et al., 2017; Contractor et al., 2014; Lahiri et al., 2014). Note that 
UAE is not classified by Hoskisson et al. (2000) as an emerging market nor as a devel-
oped one (Cuervo-Cazurra & Ramamurti, 2014). Hence, our final sample consisted of 
7 emerging and 15 developed countries.
As for other control variables, we used the World Bank data for institutional distance 
and GDP growth rate difference. Bloomberg “industry classification” and “industry sub-
group classification” were used for industry dummies and the deal relatedness variable 
respectively. Out of 224 deals in our sample, 84 represented full acquisitions, whereas 
140 represented partial acquisitions. The number of deals originated from emerging 
and developed economies were 94 and 130, respectively. The correlation matrix and de-
scriptive statistics are provided in Table 2. All VIF figures were below the stricter cutoff 
of 5, indicating that multicollinearity was not an issue in our analysis.
* Note, “multiple acquirers” at Bloomberg database means that two or more firms acquired a single target at 
exactly the same time.
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 TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations coefficients
  Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(1) Acquisi-
tion mode 0.38 0.49 1.00
(2) Insti-
tutional 
distance
1.82 1.28 -0.03 1.00
(3) GDP 
growth rate 
difference
3.45 3.15 -0.04 0.81 1.00
***
(4) Cultural 
distance- PDI 0.75 0.91 0.00 0.46 0.35 1.00
*** ***
(5) Cultural 
distance - 
IDV
1.98 1.14 0.15 -0.42 -0.40 -0.28 1.00
** *** *** ***
(6) Cultural 
distance - 
MAS
5.08 3.64 -0.06 -0.17 -0.13 -0.11 -0.33 1.00
*** * * ***
(7) Cultural 
distance - 
UAI
4.26 3.29 0.03 0.37 0.37 0.40 -0.05 -0.30 1.00
*** *** *** ***
(8) Deal 
relatedness 0.35 0.48 -0.07 0.15 0.15 0.00 -0.12 0.00 -0.02 1.00
** ** *
(9) Target 
Size 16.78 2.49 -0.16 -0.07 -0.15 -0.04 0.17 -0.06 -0.08 0.08 1.00
** ** **
(10) Acquirer 
experience 0.43 1.16 0.00 -0.17 -0.20 -0.05 0.17 0.00 -0.12 -0.04 0.07 1.00
** *** ** *
(11) Acquirer 
size 20.39 2.69 -0.10 0.01 -0.06 0.05 0.15 -0.07 -0.06 0.11 0.59 0.24 1.00
** *** ***
(12) Coun-
try-of-origin 0.42 0.49 -0.10 0.57 0.53 0.21 -0.57 0.23 -0.27 0.09 -0.18 -0.10 -0.11 1.00
  *** *** *** *** *** ***   ***   *  
Note: Definitions and related information about all variables are presented in Table 1. ***, **, and * under 
the coefficients represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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6 Results
The results of our regression analyses are provided in Table 3. Model 1 was run only 
with control variables. The chi-square and pseudo R-square for the base model were 
49.57 and 30% respectively, showing the robustness of the model. Since the dependent 
variable was coded one for full acquisition and zero for partial acquisition, a significant 
negative coefficient of e.g. target size (β = -0.231, p < 0.01) suggests that acquirers pre-
ferred partial acquisitions when the target was bigger.
The coefficient of country-of-origin (β = -1.904, p < 0.05; Model 2) suggests that 
EMMs preferred partial acquisitions and that DMMs preferred full acquisitions. Hence, 
H1 is supported. 
TABLE 3. Main results
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3
(Intercept) -0.616 -0.425 -0.626
(0.975) (1.006) (1.01)
Institutional distance -0.045 0.124 -0.002
(0.248) (0.266) (0.276)
GDP growth rate difference 0.050 0.187 0.212
(0.106) (0.125) (0.13)
Cultural distance- PDI 0.237 0.457 * 0.537 **
(0.215) (0.24) (0.249)
Cultural distance - IDV 0.602 *** 0.448 ** 0.514 **
(0.221) (0.222) (0.229)
Cultural distance - MAS 0.025 0.044 0.06
(0.057) (0.055) (0.057)
Cultural distance - UAI -0.029 -0.21 ** -0.234 **
(0.062) (0.099) (0.101)
Deal relatedness -0.282 -0.309 -0.227
(0.367) (0.373) (0.383)
Target Size -0.231 *** -0.266 *** -0.285 ***
(0.089) (0.093) (0.097)
Acquirer experience -0.106 -0.111 -0.128
(0.149) (0.148) (0.153)
Acquirer size -0.04 -0.049 -0.161 *
(0.079) (0.08) (0.093)
Country-of-origin -1.904 ** -1.769 **
(0.801) (0.832)
Country-of-origin
* Acquirer size
0.429 ***
(0.159)
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The coefficient of the interaction term (β = 0.429, p < 0.05; Model 3) suggests that 
country-of-origin effect was more pronounced for smaller firms. In other words, for 
bigger firms, country-of-origin did not matter too much for their choice of acquisition 
mode. However, for smaller MNEs, the country-of-origin effect was stronger, indicat-
ing that EMMs more often preferred partial acquisitions than DMMs. This finding sup-
ported H2. 
Figure 2 shows the interaction plot of country-of-origin effects with the acquirer 
size. Solid, dashed, and dotted lines denote the country-of-origin effect on the proba-
bility of full acquisitions at three levels of acquirer size: one standard deviation below 
mean, and one standard deviation above mean, respectively. The slope of the solid line 
is the steepest in absolute terms (smaller firms), followed by the dashed line (mean), 
with the dotted line being flattest (bigger firms) supporting our results.
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-square 30.0% 30.1% 33.6%
Model chi-square 49.57 55.93 63.52
Note: Binominal dependent variable is acquisition mode (partial acquisitions=0, full acquisitions=1). 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% level respectively.
FIGURE 2. Interaction plot
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7.  Robustness check
For a robustness check, we considered alternative ways of operationalizing several con-
trol variables. Our results were robust when we operationalized cultural distance by 
Kogut and Singh’s (1988) composite index, based on the four dimensions of Hofstede’s 
(1980) national cultural difference index (Arslan & Wang, 2015; Demirbag et al., 2007; 
Lahiri et al., 2014; Liang et al., 2009; Vasudeva et al., 2018). We obtained similar results 
when we operationalized acquirer experience as the number of years since the first in-
vestment in that country (Arslan & Wang, 2015; Chen & Hennart, 2004; Chen, 2008; 
Chikhouni et al., 2017; Mariotti et al., 2014; Tang & Cheung, 2016). In the same way, 
our findings were consistent when we replaced the difference of GDP growth rate by the 
difference in GDP in absolute terms.
We additionally operated with different definitions of full acquisitions. For our main 
results, we operationalized the dependent variable such that full acquisitions included 
transactions in which acquirers bought 100% of the target’s shares. However, a num-
ber of studies (Chikhouni et al.; 2017; Dang & Henry, 2016; Demirbag et al., 2007) 
consider a cut-off of slightly smaller than 100% for full acquisitions. The underlying 
principle behind this approach is that equity transfer of even 90% or 95% would es-
sentially have similar effects as a full acquisition. We re-ran the models, reducing the 
cut-off percentage to 95%, 90%, 85%, and even 80%. In all of the cases, the results were 
qualitatively similar as our main results. For the sake of brevity, we reported the results 
in Table 4, with 95% cut-off in Model 1 and Model 2, and that of 90% cut-off in Model 
3 and Model 4.
TABLE 4. Robustness check
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4
(Intercept) 0.261 0.046 0.590 0.433
(1.021) (1.024) (1.009) (1.011)
Institutional distance 0.268 0.155 0.290 0.179
(0.269) (0.275) (0.268) (0.275)
GDP growth rate differ-
ence
0.141 0.162 0.082 0.100
(0.123) (0.127) (0.119) (0.121)
Cultural distance- PDI 0.363 0.434 * 0.241 0.298
(0.237) (0.243) (0.230) (0.235)
Cultural distance - IDV 0.400 * 0.460 ** 0.305 0.351
(0.218) (0.224) (0.209) (0.213)
Cultural distance - MAS 0.050 0.064 0.004 0.014
(0.054) (0.056) (0.054) (0.055)
Cultural distance - UAI -0.209 ** -0.229 ** -0.171 * -0.185 *
(0.096) (0.098) (0.093) (0.094)
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8. Discussion
We would like to highlight three important points in this section. 
First, prior empirical studies on entry mode focus heavily on the characteristics of 
MNEs undertaking cross-border expansion. This study advanced previous research by 
comparing two different types of acquirers, EMMs and DMMs, investing in Japan. 
Second, we showed that, on average, EMMs preferred partial acquisitions, whereas 
DMMs preferred full acquisitions when acquiring Japanese target firms. This finding is 
opposite to that of Lahiri et al. (2014), who contrasted country-of-origin behavior of 
EMMs and DMMs and their choice of partial versus full acquisitions in the context of 
India. One reason for this finding could be that EMMs investing in India (an emerg-
ing market) had similar advantages as DMMs investing in developed markets (Cuer-
vo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Contractor et al., 2014). Our finding that EMMs preferred 
partial acquisitions is supported by the springboard perspective (Luo & Tung, 2007). 
The authors argue that EMMs expand in developed markets primarily to acquire assets 
and brand names to transfer them home. They further contend that a shared-owner-
ship entry mode such as minority joint venture is preferred for knowledge acquisition. 
More specifically, cooperative alliances and joint ventures are effective mechanisms to 
transfer tacit knowledge. Hence, this explanation predicts that EMMs would avoid full 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4
Deal relatedness -0.387 -0.316 -0.458 -0.399
(0.369) (0.377) (0.361) (0.367)
Target Size -0.287 *** -0.302 *** -0.335 *** -0.344 ***
(0.093) (0.095) (0.092) (0.094)
Acquirer experience -0.119 -0.136 -0.118 -0.132
(0.149) (0.154) (0.149) (0.152)
Acquirer size -0.027 -0.124 0.034 -0.047
(0.079) (0.091) (0.078) (0.088)
Country-of-origin
-2.051 *** -1.912 ** -1.935 ** -1.791 **
(0.784) (0.809) (0.752) (0.769)
Country-of-origin * 
Acquirer size
0.380 ** 0.335 **
(0.158) (0.155)
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-square 29.4% 32.2% 27.5% 29.8%
Model chi-square 54.75     60.73     51.28     56.11  
Note: Binominal dependent variable is acquisition mode (partial acquisitions=0, full acquisitions=1). 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively.
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acquisitions in developed markets. Luo and Tung (2007) additionally mention that 
there are several challenges unique to EMMs such as poor corporate governance and a 
lack of global experience. Such challenges make full acquisitions a high-risk entry mode 
(Herrmann & Datta, 2002) and a more difficult-to-manage task for EMMs, compared 
to their DMM counterparts. These ideas go in line with Hennart (2012), who raises 
similar concerns that a lack of resources and management skills at EMMs is arguably 
one reason these firms avoid establishing wholly-owned subsidiaries abroad. 
Third, our findings that the country-of-origin effect is stronger for smaller acquir-
ers (H2) is supported by the springboard perspective. As mentioned, Luo and Tung 
(2007) note that EMMs find difficulties in the post-integration phase due to a lack of 
experience and competence. That should matter much more for smaller EMMs. Luo 
and Tung (2007) further observe that available options to EMMs in such a situation 
include hiring a local talent, approach leading consulting firms for training, and rotating 
senior executives along regional, divisional and functional lines. In fact, Wright et al. 
(2005) argue that smaller EMMs entering developed markets have lower margins of 
error due to their constrained resources.
9.  Managerial implications, limitations, and future research directions
Our findings have some managerial implications for DMMs and EMMs planning ac-
quisitions in a developed market. First, EMMs who plan acquisitions in developed 
markets should not consider full acquisition of their targets. They should not get side-
tracked by the behavior of DMMs. Compared to DMMs, EMMs often lack managerial 
expertise required in the post-integration phase (Luo & Tung, 2007). Second, DMMs 
making acquisitions in developed markets should realize that a full acquisition is only 
an optimal solution as long as their intangible assets (such as unique technology) are 
not easily accessible to other firms in that host country (Hennart, 2012). Finally, firms 
in developed markets looking for potential buyers/partners should realize that DMMs 
and EMMs are considerably different in terms of their capabilities and motivation to 
conduct acquisitions (Luo & Tung, 2007). While bigger EMMs may have expert man-
agerial competence and pursue acquisitions for exploitation of their intangible assets, 
the majority of EMMs, especially the smaller ones, make cross-border acquisitions to 
lift their capabilities (Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 2009). These differences in characteris-
tics have important implications for employees at target firms. 
Our findings have to be interpreted with caution. First, we focused only on acquisitions, 
neglecting Greenfield investments or any other kind of contractual agreements. Second, on 
the target side, we focused only on a single country, Japan. Additionally, as we focused only 
on the deals for which acquirer did not have any ownership in the target prior to the trans-
action, our analysis may be limited due to sample selection bias. This is because acquirers 
with some ownership (toehold) in the target are expected to show different acquisition 
behavior as compared with acquirers without any ownership in the target.
26 
Our limitations provide intriguing avenues for future research that can focus on spe-
cific industries to leverage their unique dynamics. Guillen and Garcia-Canal (2009) 
mention that EMMs, depending on their home countries, tend to emerge from certain 
industries and not from others. More specifically, future research can focus on the fi-
nancial industry to see how DMMs and EMMs differ in their choice of partial versus 
full acquisitions. In fact, contrary to our findings, Petrou (2007) found evidence based 
on a sample of banks that DMMs preferred shared-ownership, unlike EMMs, which 
preferred to acquire banks fully. Another potential area of research is the entry mode 
choice of born-global firms (Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 2009). Lately, there has been an 
increase of born-global firms stemming from EMMs, which may provide material for 
case studies. Similarly, future research can address how EMMs with toehold differ in 
their acquisition behavior as compared with the ones without any ownership in the 
target prior to the deal. Moreover, future research can also leverage qualitative data and 
illustrative case studies to investigate EMMs’ acquisition behavior. 
10.  Conclusion
In this study, we focused on differences between EMMs and DMMs for their choice of 
partial versus full acquisitions of targets in a developed market country, namely Japan. 
Additionally, we focused on the moderating effect of acquirer size on the relationship 
between the acquirer’s country-of-origin and the acquisition mode. Based on our sam-
ple of cross-border acquisitions, we found that EMMs preferred partial acquisitions, 
whereas DMMs preferred full acquisitions. Additionally, we found an interactive effect 
of country-of-origin and acquirer size; the tendency of EMMs to prefer partial acqui-
sitions was more pronounced for smaller bidders. Our findings remained consistent 
when additional robustness checks were applied. The authors hope that this study in-
spires further research on EMMs, entry mode, and cross-border acquisitions. 
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